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About CTSC 
The mission of the Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC) is to improve 
the cybersecurity of NSF science and engineering projects, while allowing those projects to 
focus on their science endeavors.  This mission is accomplished through one-on-one 
engagements with projects to address their specific challenges; education, outreach, and 
training to raise the state of security practice across the scientific enterprise; and leadership on 
bringing the best and most relevant cybersecurity research to bear on the NSF 
cyberinfrastructure research community. For more information about the Center for 
Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure please visit: http://trustedci.org/. 
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Executive Summary 
 
The Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC) is transforming and improving 
the practice of cybersecurity and hence the trustworthiness of NSF scientific 
cyberinfrastructure (CI). CTSC is providing readily available cybersecurity expertise and services, 
as well as leadership in advancing the state of practice and coordination across a broad range of 
NSF scientific CI projects via a series of engagements with NSF CI projects and a broader 
ongoing education, outreach and training effort. 
The vision of CTSC is an NSF CI community in which 1) each project knows where it fits in a 
coherent cybersecurity ecosystem and can assess its own needs; 2) each project has access to 
the tools and needed help to enact a basic cybersecurity program and tackle the project’s 
advanced challenges; 3) sharing of experiences and collaboration between projects is the norm; 
and 4) cybersecurity is greatly benefited by leveraging services, universities, I2, and broader 
community best practices. 
Towards this vision, CTSC is organized by three thrusts: 1) Engagements with specific 
communities to address their individual challenges; 2) Education, Outreach and Training, 
providing the NSF scientific CI community with training, student education, best practice 
guides, and lessons learned documents; and 3) Cybersecurity Leadership, building towards a 
coherent, interoperable cybersecurity community and ecosystem. 
This report covers CTSC’s successful first year, in which it initiated seven engagements, 
completing three (LTER Network Office, LIGO, Pegasus), is in the process of finalizing three 
more (DataONE, IceCube, CyberGIS) and initiating a seventh (Globus Online). Accomplishments 
include 1) developing a process for developing NSF CI Cybersecurity programs that incorporates 
well-known best practices and tackles NSF CI challenges of residing in a complicated, multi-
institution ecosystem with unique science instruments and data; 2) re-starting and organizing 
the NSF Cybersecurity Summit along with an online Trusted CI Forum to foster an ongoing NSF 
community focused on NSF CI cybersecurity; and 3) delivering seven training sessions by 
leveraging prior training materials from the University of Wisconsin team and creating two new 
tutorials. Educational activities include 1) creating a new education module on cybersecurity for 
CI that is being utilized in a class at the University of Illinois this Fall; 2) mentoring of a student 
in Indiana University’s Summer of Networking program; 3) and the ongoing membership of two 
graduate students in the CTSC team as research assistants. Our broader impacts include the 
publication of engagement products and three other papers to define community best 
practices. 
Year two plans are described that continue the emphasis on these three thrusts and building 
the community working on cybersecurity with the Trusted CI Forum and a vision for continued 
CI and Large Facility Cybersecurity Summits. 
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1  Introduction: CTSC Overview and Vision 
 
The Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC) is transforming and improving 
the practice of cybersecurity and hence trustworthiness of NSF scientific cyberinfrastructure 
(CI). CTSC is providing readily available cybersecurity expertise and services, as well as 
leadership and coordination across a broad range of NSF scientific CI projects via a series of 
engagements with NSF CI projects and a broader ongoing education, outreach and training 
effort. 
As NSF pushes towards its vision of “a comprehensive, integrated, sustainable, and secure CI,” 
cybersecurity plays a key role. However, two recent Scientific Software Security Innovation 
Institute workshops [1], which included representatives of 35 major NSF-funded CI projects, 
determined that the NSF CI community faces strong challenges in obtaining access to 
cybersecurity expertise. Projects are forced to divert their resources to develop that expertise, 
address risks haphazardly, unknowingly reinvent basic cybersecurity solutions, and struggle 
with interoperability. 
Contributing to the need for expertise is the fact cybersecurity is not a challenge to be solved by 
a single technology solution. Every project has its own culture, risk tolerance, legacy 
technologies, collaboration patterns, and timelines, making a technological “silver bullet” 
unfeasible. Even when security expertise is available within a project, the complex NSF CI 
ecosystem brings significant challenges in cross-project collaborations and knowledge 
dissemination. Lessons learned are shared haphazardly between projects. Important 
institutional knowledge is often lost when a project is completed or key personnel leave the 
community. Additionally, requiring each CI project to tackle cybersecurity independently is 
inefficient and often redundant. It leads to multiple implementations that do not interoperate 
and confound the goal of scientific collaboration, data stewardship, and dissemination. 
The vision of CTSC is an NSF CI community in which 1) each project knows where it fits in a 
coherent cybersecurity ecosystem and can assess its own needs; 2) each project has access to 
the tools and needed help to enact a basic cybersecurity program and tackle the project’s 
advanced challenges; 3) sharing of experiences and collaboration between projects is the norm; 
and 4) cybersecurity is greatly benefited by leveraging services, universities, I2, and broader 
community best practices. 
Towards this vision, CTSC is organized by three thrusts: 1) Engagements with specific 
communities to address their individual challenges; 2) Education, Outreach and Training, 
providing the NSF scientific CI community with training, student education, best practice 
guides, and lessons learned documents; and 3) Cybersecurity Leadership, building towards a 
coherent, interoperable cybersecurity community and ecosystem.  
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2  Engagements 
 
One of CTSC’s three thrusts is an ongoing set of engagements with NSF-funded scientific CI 
projects to solve cybersecurity challenges faced by those projects. During the first year, CTSC 
completed engagements with the LTER Network Office, the LIGO Scientific Collaboration and 
Pegasus; engagements with CyberGIS, DataONE, and IceCube are wrapping up at the end of the 
year; and a new engagement with Globus Online is underway. As CTSC enters year two we are 
already in discussion with other projects (SEAD, Open Science Data Cloud) as potential 
engagements and plan on an open call for engagements as described in our Year 2 Plans. 
In this section we describe each of the engagements in turn, including the resulting benefits for 
the engaged projects and the broader scientific community. Importantly, all CTSC engagement 
plans call for follow-up contact with engagement communities to assess the impact of the 
engagements.  For the three completed engagements, we solicited and included a statement 
from the project regarding the engagement. We will solicit feedback from the other year one 
engagements in year two. 
In addition to these larger engagements, CTSC has recognized a need for shorter, informal 
interactions with projects that may turn into longer engagements or may satisfy a project’s 
needs in themselves. In our first year, CTSC staff reviewed a technical plan for certificate 
renewal for the Open Science Grid and provided the SEAD project with basic guidance for 
identity management. As we discuss in our Year 2 plans, we will be more explicit in offering this 
type of assistance to the NSF community. 
CTSC declined one engagement in its first year, an XSEDE science gateway project which we 
determined would be best served by the XSEDE project directly. 
 
2.1  LTER Network Office 
 
The Long Term Ecological Research Network (LNO)1 supports 26 sites and over 2000 scientists 
and graduate students with a long-term vision of “society in which long-term ecological 
knowledge contributes to the advancement of the health, productivity, and welfare of the 
global environment, thereby advancing human well-being.” 
The LNO engagement goal was to develop a risk-based cybersecurity plan. Specifically CTSC 
performed a risk assessment for the LNO Provenance Aware Synthesis Tracking Architecture 
(PASTA) data repository service, and then utilized that risk assessment to produce a 
cybersecurity plan for that service. LNO staff were engaged with us through the process so the 
transfer of the expertise from CTSC to LNO was also a part of this process. 
                                                             
1 http://lternet.edu/ - funded by NSF BIO/DEB 
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PASTA is a developing model for dynamically harvesting and archiving site-based data and 
metadata of the LNO for use in generating synthetically derived data products. These derived 
data products are then accessed through multiple user and machine interfaces. All derived data 
are described by a rich and structured Ecological Metadata Language (EML) document, which 
emphasizes the product processing history and its origin – the product “provenance”.  
PASTA serves the ecological community with access to the data and analysis tools produced by 
the LTER sites and projects. It provides a portal based entry to search, analyze, contribute data, 
and more. A key focus of the engagement was to assess the PASTA identity and access 
management system that registers users, authenticates them, and applies authorizations to 
data, users, and services.  
The result of our the team effort between LNO and CTSC was to document and prioritize the 
LNO PASTA risks and then design a cybersecurity plan that addressed the identified risks with a 
combination of security best practices and additional controls for specific risks. The risk 
assessment and cybersecurity plan were delivered to LNO, who have been actively 
implementing the plan to protect the PASTA data repository. 
 
Mark Servilla, Lead Scientist at LNO, provided the following statement: 
 
The Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC) convened its first 
cyber-security review and assessment of the Long Term Ecological Research 
(LTER) Network Office and the Provenance Aware Synthesis Tracking Architecture 
(PASTA) in February 2013.  The engagement started with a 3-day meeting which 
was prefaced by an extensive analysis of LTER Network policies, procedures, and 
architecture.  The CTSC team was thorough in their analysis and professional in 
their demeanor. Two significant artifacts were produced: (1) a cyber-security 
assessment of existing practices and architecture and (2) a forward-looking 
cyber-security plan for the LTER Network Office and PASTA. 
 
The cyber-security assessment provided detailed review of existing LTER Network 
Office practices and architecture and provided a necessary baseline from which 
to gage change and improvement. Specifically, the assessment identified 
strengths and weaknesses of current cyber-security practices followed by the 
LTER Network Office and of the nascent PASTA framework of the Network 
Information System. This latter aspect of the assessment occurred a 
fundamentally critical point in system design such that issues could easily be 
mitigated prior to the full production release of PASTA.  The assessment also 
prioritized cyber-security countermeasures that became the foundation of LTER 
Network Office Cyber-security Plan. 
 
The LTER Network Cyber-security Plan is a forward looking approach to 
increasing cyber-security for LTER Network assets (data and infrastructure).  The 
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plan is structured such that highest risk elements of LTER Network assets are 
protected early on in the implementation strategy, while lower risk elements or 
those already protected reasonably well are addressed later.  The CTSC team, in 
developing the plan, also provided reference to public and commercial software 
resources and infrastructure that may be utilized by the LTER Network Office in 
building cyber-security defenses. 
 
In summary, the CTSC review and assessment provided crucial insight into 
existing cyber-security practices and architecture of the LTER Network Office and 
the PASTA framework. This effort set a baseline reference from which meaningful 
change can be measured and provided a concrete and specific cyber-security plan 
for LTER Network office personnel to implement. 
 
2.2  DataONE 
 
DataONE (Data Observation Network for Earth)2 is a federated data network built to improve 
access to Earth science data, and to support science by: (1) engaging the relevant science, data, 
and policy communities; (2) facilitating easy, secure, and persistent storage of data; and (3) 
disseminating integrated and user-friendly tools for data discovery, analysis, visualization, and 
decision-making. 
DataONE has invested significant effort into the development of an identity management (IdM) 
system that supports federated identities from a wide variety of identity providers and includes 
mechanisms and procedures to support access management. The DataONE identity 
management system forms the trust fabric by which DataONE Member Nodes, Coordinating 
Nodes and users interact, and hence is critical to DataONE’s long-term success. CTSC and 
DataONE collaborated on a design-level review of the DataONE IdM system implementation 
with the following goals: 
 Identify the specific software components to be reviewed.  
 Identify (or assist in creating) documentation of those components sufficient to review 
them. 
 Perform and document an assessment of those components that is of use to DataONE. 
 Assess potential vulnerabilities, scalability, interoperability and supportability 
Aspects of  DataONE’s IdM system that were examined included Member Nodes, Coordinating 
Nodes, CILogon, certificate management, identity mapping and the Identity API and 
Authorization API. Other off-the-shelf components such as LDAP were not the focus of the 
review. Furthermore, the DataONE project internal IDM system for project collaboration was 
out of scope. 
                                                             
2 http://www.dataone.org/ - funded by NSF ITR/DATANET 
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The review process was conducted at a two day face-to-face meeting between the CTSC and 
DataONE teams. This meeting was held in an informal ad-hoc style. Prior to the face-to-face 
meeting, the CTSC team reviewed documents identified by DataONE as being valuable to 
understanding the IdM system.  
CTSC is preparing a report documenting the review findings. This report includes a system 
characterization describing the DataONE IdM system and CTSC’s review of DataONE’s 
documentation of their IdM system. The report is substantially complete at this time, CTSC and 
DataONE have already discussed the findings, and CTSC is finalizing the report by providing 
extra guidance to DataONE on certain topics per their request. 
With the growth of federated identity and projects (e.g., Globus Online, CILogon, iRods) 
supporting multiple forms of authentication, systems such as DataONE’s IdM system are 
becoming more common. Identifying and documenting best practices and lessons learned for 
such systems will have broad impact across current and future systems. As a recoverable for 
future engagements, CTSC plans to create a document describing a general set of principles for 
similar identity management systems and process for assessing those systems. 
 
2.3  Pegasus 
 
Pegasus3 is a workflow management system (WMS) for scientific workflows [2]. Quoting from 
the Pegasus website: “Pegasus bridges the scientific domain and the execution environment by 
automatically mapping high-level workflow descriptions onto distributed resources. It 
automatically locates the necessary input data and computational resources necessary for 
workflow execution. Pegasus enables scientists to construct workflows in abstract terms 
without worrying about the details of the underlying execution environment or the particulars 
of the low-level specifications required by the middleware (Condor, Globus, or Amazon EC2). 
Pegasus also bridges the current cyberinfrastructure by effectively coordinating multiple 
distributed resources.” 
Pegasus workflows typically operate across distributed resources and sometimes need to stage 
data files between compute resources to or from storage resources. When such staging 
requires secure shell (SSH), Pegasus’ current practice is to send a private key with the workflow 
to perform a secure copy. The goal of this engagement was to examine this practice and 
recommend any possible improvements from the perspective of cybersecurity. 
The report produced by our engagement [3], develops a set of security criteria by which to 
judge different options that could be implemented by the Pegasus project. Based on those 
criteria, we provides three recommendations to the Pegasus team to improve current practice: 
(1) If system administrators are willing, have them deploy a mechanism that supports security 
delegation, such as Kerberos or GSI; (2) provide assistance to users in using SSH’s ability to 
impose restrictions in the authorized_keys file to limit the privileges of SSH keys used for 
                                                             
3 http://pegasus.isi.edu/ - funded by NSF SI2, suporting many projects: http://pegasus.isi.edu/applications 
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workflows; and (3) utilize ssh-agent to minimize exposure of SSH credentials in the workflow by 
avoiding writing those credentials to the filesystem. Our report also describes alternatives we 
considered, but did not recommend and considers the relevant use case of using Pegasus with 
Amazon S3. 
Pegasus’ challenge is a general one, potentially faced by any workflow system. Hence, our 
report was made publicly available to benefit the broader community. 
Ewa Deelman, Pegasus PI, provided the following statement: 
 
Our engagement with CTSC focused on the problem of how to avoid the storage 
of SSH credentials on the local filesystem of the worker nodes for the duration of 
job execution. The CTSC team came up with a set of recommendations some of 
which we plan to incorporate in Pegasus in the near future. During this exercise, 
the two teams also explored various alternatives that initially looked promising 
and feasible, but later had to be discounted because of potential security holes or 
increased complexity of the system. 
Overall, we would characterize the engagement as a success, as it has helped us 
identify and formalize various solutions. The associated engagement report will 
serve an blueprint on how to tackle this problem and we feel that it's applicability 
is not limited only to Pegasus but to other systems that support distributed 
execution of jobs. 
 
2.4  LIGO 
 
The Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) Scientific Collaboration4 is a 
large research project funded by the National Science Foundation. LIGO seeks to make the first 
direct detection of gravitational waves, use them to explore the fundamental physics of gravity, 
and develop the emerging field of gravitational wave science as a tool of astronomical 
discovery. 
The primary goal of CTSC’s LIGO engagement was to apply CTSC experience and expertise in 
leveraging SAML identity federations in order to remove barriers for efficient international 
collaboration between LIGO and other astronomy and astrophysics projects. Together CTSC and 
LIGO launched three simultaneous efforts to explore international SAML federation between 
LIGO and its collaborators. The three efforts were chosen to span the spectrum of federation 
approaches from point-to-point direct federation to bilateral federation agreements between 
existing large national SAML federations so that LIGO could (1) better understand  the policy 
and technical issues surrounding international federation, (2) better understand the timelines 
necessary for each approach, and (3) begin to develop a long-term strategy for international 
interfederation in support of LIGO’s long-term scientific mission. The objective was to 
                                                             
4 http://www.ligo.org/ - funded by NSF MPS/PHY 
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characterize each approach and determine if all three would be needed to support LIGO’s 
interfederation goals. 
The three efforts were: 
1. Establishing a point-to-point federation between LIGO service providers and an identity 
provider able to authenticate and assert attributes for members of the KAGRA5 project 
in Japan. 
2. LIGO joining the Italian IDEM SAML federation operated by GARR6, the Italian National 
Research and Education Network (NREN), in order to support federation between LIGO 
services and users in the Virgo7 project, a French and Italian project to detect 
gravitational waves. 
3. To leverage LIGO’s existing investment in InCommon, establishing a bilateral federation 
between InCommon in the US and the UK Access Management Federation for Education 
and Research (UK Federation). The UK federation was chosen because of the large 
number of existing LIGO collaborators in the UK and because InCommon and the UK 
already had begun some interfederation work. 
Of the three efforts, the point-to-point federation with a KAGRA identity provider was 
underway already when the CTSC and LIGO engagement began, but the effort was intensified 
and focused by CTSC staff. CTSC and LIGO staff initiated the other two efforts directly as part of 
the CTSC and LIGO engagement. 
The point-to-point approach with the KAGRA identity provider demonstrated that point-to-
point federations continue to be useful even as larger and more comprehensive international 
interfederation agreements are pursued. Point-to-point federations are simply easier and more 
efficient for focused efforts aimed at enabling collaboration for specific groups of researchers. 
The second effort, with LIGO attempting to join IDEM, stalled with the legal department at the 
California Institute of Technology (Caltech). The stall reinforces that barriers remain high for 
virtual organizations and projects seeking to join national identity federations, where the 
traditional process is tailored to higher education institutions, and legal obligations and liability 
play a significant role in negotiating membership. 
The third effort leveraged LIGO’s existing investment in InCommon. The CTSC/LIGO staff 
chartered the InCommon Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) Interfederation Subcommittee.8 
The committee included the CTSC/LIGO engagement staff, InCommon Operations staff, UK 
Federation staff, and interested members of the broader community. To investigate and 
support the LIGO use case, the committee pursued an exchange of select SAML metadata 
between InCommon and the UK Federation. The effort built upon work already underway in the 
                                                             
5 http://gwcenter.icrr.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/  
6 https://www.idem.garr.it/en  
7 http://www.ego-gw.it/virgodescription/pag_4.html  
8 https://spaces.internet2.edu/x/DAMlAg 
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UK to support interfederation trials.9 The committee focused on the specific use case of 
federating a Cardiff University identity provider with the main LIGO wiki, with the goal of 
allowing both LIGO collaboration members at Cardiff and their colleagues with research 
interests in astronomy and astrophysics to reach the LIGO wiki using their Cardiff identities. This 
goal was achieved: LIGO collaboration members at Cardiff have accessed wiki.ligo.org using 
their Cardiff identities. LIGO did not join the UK federation nor directly insert metadata into the 
UK federation but instead leveraged its membership in InCommon to effect the metadata 
exchange to meet this goal. 
A secondary goal of the CTSC-LIGO engagement was to assist LIGO by improving IdM 
collaborations with LIGO-India. This involved the development of federation use cases in 
support of the LIGO science mission, to be used as a driver for the continued development of a 
viable SAML identity federation in India, as well as assisting LIGO with training of LIGO-India 
staff on issues of federated identity management. In February 2013 Scott Koranda from CTSC 
and LIGO and Stuart Anderson from LIGO traveled to The Inter-University Centre for Astronomy 
and Astrophysics (IUCAA) in Pune, India for a three day meeting where they presented an 
introduction to and training on identity management for scientific organizations in general and 
for LIGO specifically, with an emphasis on SAML identity federations and interfederation. The 
training material developed by CTSC/LIGO for the visit is available online10 and may be 
repurposed for use with other scientific organizations. 
In conclusion, the CTSC-LIGO engagement made concrete progress toward enabling 
international identity federation for collaboration between LIGO and other astronomy and 
astrophysics projects, blazing a trail for use of identity federation in other international 
scientific collaborations. The joint CTSC-LIGO effort demonstrated prototype interoperability 
between a LIGO service and a UK identity provider, and as an additional outcome the effort also 
brought InCommon closer to joining the international eduGAIN11 interfederation project. The 
effort also brought LIGO closer to interoperability with federations in India and Italy. Continued 
effort on interfederation by LIGO and InCommon is expected. 
The CTSC-LIGO engagement produced three technical reports: 
 Final Report for LIGO Engagement [4] 
 A Study of Three Approaches to International Identity Federation for LIGO [5] 
 InCommon Membership in eduGAIN: the LIGO Perspective [6] 
Additionally, the identity management training has been generalized and will be delivered at 
the subsequently described Cybersecurity Summit. 
 
 
                                                             
9 http://www.ukfederation.org.uk/content/Documents/InterfederationTrialFAQ 
10 https://dcc.ligo.org/LIGO-G1300690/public 
11 http://www.geant.net/service/eduGAIN/Pages/home.aspx  
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Warren Anderson, project manager for the LIGO Identity and Access Management project, 
provided the following statement:  
 
LIGO is an international astronomy effort funded by the NSF to detect 
gravitational waves, a phenomenon predicted by Einstein in 1916 but not yet 
experimentally verified. The LIGO Scientific Collaboration is a body composed of 
over 1000 scientists from 20 countries on five continents. Furthermore, LIGO is 
part of a broader international gravitational wave community, with partner 
experiments in Germany, Italy and Japan. Finally, LIGO participates in a number 
of "multi-messenger astronomy" collaborations in which results from searches 
for gravitational waves are combined with astronomical observations of radio 
waves, visible light, x-rays, gamma-rays and neutrinos. These partnerships 
involve many more scientists from many more countries. In short, LIGO is part of 
a global astronomical network. 
A key tool of any scientific collaboration is an easily accessed and managed 
collaborative space. Over the past five years, LIGO has worked toward and 
Identity and Access Management solution involving industry standard tools such 
as Kerberos and OpenLDAP augmented by Internet2 middleware (Grouper and 
Shibboleth) and similar enabling technologies (e.g. CILogon) to provide a 
framework for building a collaborative space within LIGO. This does not in itself, 
however, address the problem of collaboration with the larger gravitational-
wave astronomy community or our multi-messenger partners. 
While national infrastructure, such as InCommon, is beginning to address the 
IAM needs of LIGO member institutions and their partners within national 
borders, this is insufficient for our needs. For instance, LIGO still does not have in 
place identity federation with a number of our important scientific partners, 
including VIRGO, an Italian-French gravitational wave project who is currently 
our closest collaborator. By beginning the enrollment process for LIGO in IDEM, 
CTSC has helped clearly identify one of the key limiting factors in current 
processes for scientific collaborations like LIGO. Unlike many entities that need 
federated identity, LIGO is a loose affiliation of groups from various research 
institutions and has no legal standing on its own. Therefore, any contractual 
obligations LIGO wishes to engage in require the backing of one or more legal 
entities involved - usually one of the universities which administer the LIGO 
operating grants. In the case of IDEM, the campus which was asked to enter into 
the contractual agreement with the Italian IDEM SAML federation was the 
CalTech Institute of Technology (CIT). However, CIT legal is loathe to enter into 
contracts involving people and resources which they are not directly responsible 
for, which is the case for much of LIGO. This points clearly to the need for inter-
federation at a higher level that provides an umbrella for the needs of scientific 
collaborations such as LIGO. 
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As an example, CTSC has enabled us to test internationally federated identity 
within LIGO through the engagement between InCommon and the UK Access 
Management Federation for Education and Research. However, this is only the 
beginning of what LIGO needs. With the upgraded sensitivity of second 
generation of LIGO, expected to come online within the next few years, first 
detection of gravitational waves (and subsequent detections) are expected to 
happen at timescales of months to weeks after observation begins. The pressure 
for coordinated observations and collaboration can reasonably be expected to 
exponentiate at this time. It will be central to LIGO and its collaborators to enable 
collaborative sharing with as few obstacles as possible going forward, and 
federated identity across as many international and institutional borders as 
possible will be the first step in enabling such collaboration. Having international 
identity federation agreements and infrastructure in place at that time will 
greatly ease this pressure. LIGO sincerely hopes that CTSC will play a lead role in 
enabling such agreements and infrastructure going forward. 
 
2.5  IceCube 
 
The IceCube South Pole Neutrino Observatory12 is a particle detector at the South Pole that 
records the interactions of a nearly massless subatomic particle called the neutrino. IceCube 
searches for neutrinos from the most violent astrophysical sources: events like exploding stars, 
gamma ray bursts, and cataclysmic phenomena involving black holes and neutron stars. The 
IceCube telescope is a powerful tool to search for dark matter, and could reveal the new 
physical processes associated with the enigmatic origin of the highest energy particles in 
nature. In addition to exploring the background of neutrinos produced in the atmosphere, 
IceCube studies the neutrinos themselves; their energies far exceed those produced by 
accelerator beams. IceCube is the world's largest neutrino detector, encompassing a cubic 
kilometer of ice. 
The CTSC Team began working with the IceCube project to develop a cybersecurity plan 
tailored to the needs of the project to protect and ensure the integrity of research data and 
IceCube resources.  The engagement began in June 2013 with the CTSC team traveling to the 
IceCube office in Madison to collect information about the IceCube environment to develop a 
system characterization document.  Once we had the system characterization completed the 
team began working on the risk assessment.  The IceCube team has been very interactive 
during the engagement, reviewing the supporting documents in a shared repository.  The 
assessment phase included reviewing the existing security policies IceCube has developed.  At 
the time of this report, the risk assessment is nearly complete and cybersecurity plan 
development has begun. In addition to the planned engagement deliverables, CTSC will be 
providing the IceCube project with a Security Best Practices Guide for Commodity Information 
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Technology. This guide will also be made publicly available on the CTSC website as a resource 
for the CI community. The engagement is scheduled to be completed in November 2013. 
 
2.6  CyberGIS 
 
The CyberGIS project13 seeks to use CI to allow researchers to interact with large data sets and 
complex analysis software, something not commonly found with conventional Geographic 
Information System (GIS) software approaches. While the CyberGIS project consists of many 
activities, the CyberGIS-CTSC engagement chose to focus effort on the CyberGIS Gateways.  
The CyberGIS Gateways are web-based portal which allows end-users to run various GIS-based 
software packages on datasets. End-users can upload and manage their own (potentially 
private) datasets, or access publicly available datasets such as those provided by the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS). There are two CyberGIS Gateways available to users. The first has a 
larger list of available “apps” with an older interface, while the second has a small list of “apps” 
with a new user interface design. It is anticipated that the interface of the second Gateway will 
eventually supplant the main Gateway interface. 
CyberGIS implements its own identity access management system, with each Gateway having 
its own user database. User access to the Gateways is granted with a simple username / 
password login page. While currently the majority of users are US-based researchers and 
students, with backgrounds in GIS, disaster management, and disease modeling, the Gateways 
are designed for a broad spectrum of users who may not have extensive experience in GIS. 
Thus, the interface is meant to be as simple as possible while allowing access to powerful GIS 
software. 
CTSC met with CyberGIS personnel to perform a risk assessment of the CyberGIS Gateway 
system architecture. CyberGIS developers also sought solutions to specific questions regarding 
their code development and server configuration. CTSC performed and documented a detailed 
risk assessment outlining several vulnerabilities and possible controls for these vulnerabilities. 
The risk assessment was used as the basis for a cybersecurity plan. This plan categorized issues 
as problems with documentation, architecture, or operations. The plan then recommended 
tasks to address the issues sorted into short- (could be done in the order of weeks), medium- 
(would take on the order of months), and longer-term tasks. CTSC also addressed the specific 
questions from CyberGIS developers by creating a list of Suggested Best Practices consisting of 
detailed implementation solutions. CTSC is currently in discussion with the CyberGIS project 
regarding making the Engagement results public. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
13 http://cybergis.org/ - Funded by NSF SI2 in conjunction with NSF SBE/GSS 
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2.7  Globus Online 
 
In September of 2013, CTSC began an engagement with the Globus Online (GO)14 team at the 
Argonne National Laboratory and University of Chicago. The GO flagship service provides a 
“...fast, reliable file transfer service that makes it easy for any user to move any data anywhere. 
Recommended by HPC centers and user communities of all kinds, Globus Online automates the 
time-consuming and error-prone activity of managing file transfers, so users can stay focused 
on what’s most important: their research.” Recently the GO team added functionality to 
support sharing, i.e.“big data sharing and transfer with dropbox like simplicity”15. GO is used by 
a number of NSF and other projects16, making it an important CI component in terms of 
cybersecurity for the NSF CI ecosystem. 
The primary focus of the CTSC/GO engagement is to conduct a cybersecurity review of the 
architecture and design of the new sharing functionality. After an initial call to kick off the 
engagement, the GO team is collecting and preparing design and architecture documentation 
to share with CTSC staff and aid in the formal construction of the engagement plan. 
 
3  Education, Outreach and Training 
 
A key component of our mission to achieve more trustworthy NSF scientific CI is the 
development of new cybersecurity expertise through the creation, dissemination, and delivery 
of training and educational materials. Towards this end, CTSC undertakes a set of Education, 
Outreach and Training (EOT) activities. 
 
3.1  Training 
 
Providing cybersecurity training to professionals in NSF CI community is a significant activity 
within CTSC and currently takes the form of lecture-style training materials delivered in person 
by CTSC staff. During CTSC’s first year, primarily leveraging the prior work of the University of 
Wisconsin team, tutorials have been given at major venues, including XSEDE 2013, ESSOS 2013 
(International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems), Condor Week 2013, 
and Supercomputing 2012. Additionally, special training sessions were delivered to the DHS-
funded Software Assurance Marketplace (SWAMP)17 implementation team and the LIGO-India 
staff. CTSC will also be presenting three training sessions at the upcoming NSF Cybersecurity 
Summit. Under other funding, the University of Wisconsin team leveraged the CTSC-developed 
                                                             
14 https://www.globusonline.org/ - Funded by NSF SI2 
15 Private communication with the GO team. 
16 https://www.globusonline.org/stories/ 
17 http://continuousassurance.org/  
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materials in presenting training sessions at Infosys (India’s second largest IT company) and at 
the University of Chile. 
CTSC development of new training materials over the first year have been focused on: (1) 
extending previous work at the University of Wisconsin on secure coding and vulnerability 
assessment; (2) the development of a tutorial on identity management and federation; and (3) 
the development of tutorial on risk-based cybersecurity targeted at NSF PIs and management. 
The secure coding training materials have been extended to include subjects relevant to the 
NSF CI community: more scripting languages (expanded coverage of Perl and Python, and 
including Ruby), data serialization attacks, and XML attacks. This work augments related 
material added under other funding for C#, a major language for web and distributed systems 
work. The vulnerability assessment materials have been extended with several new sections, 
including a key “Owning the Bits” section (attacks from the point of view of the hacker), and 
personnel have started initial work on practical (hands on) exercises. 
Building from our engagement with LIGO, CTSC developed a tutorial on identity management 
and federation that was initially delivered to LIGO’s collaborators in India to help foster LIGO’s 
International collaboration efforts and will be presented at the upcoming NSF Cybersecurity 
Summit. The tutorial does not assume any previous experience with building identity 
management infrastructure for scientific organizations and introduces vocabulary necessary to 
interact with the identity federation communities. It also discusses “lessons learned” by LIGO as 
it went through the process of building an identity and access management infrastructure to 
support a large virtual organization. 
With respect to the Risk-based Cybersecurity tutorial, CTSC documented the process that it 
utilized for LNO, CyberGIS and IceCube, and turned that into a 4 hour long training session that 
educates NSF PI’s on the importance of cybersecurity from a science CI perspective, teaches 
them the basics of performing a risk assessment of their project, transitions from that into the 
design of a cybersecurity program, and outlines the steps to put such a program into operation. 
This training will debut at the NSF Cybersecurity Summit. 
 
3.2  Education 
 
Our education activities focus on the undergraduate and graduate level. CTSC develops 
cybersecurity modules for undergraduate and graduate level courses that focus on important 
aspects of securing scientific CI. CTSC education modules are designed with two types of 
audience in mind: (1) students with a background in computer security, but who may not be 
familiar with the security needs and requirements of scientific CI (target audience group 1), and 
(2) students who are end users of CI, but who may not necessarily have a background in 
security (target audience group 2). Accordingly, the education modules developed will present 
topics in the context of scientific CI and can be incorporated into dedicated security courses (for 
target group 1) or into courses on other aspects of scientific computing (for target group 2).  
  18 Year 1 Report – Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure 
During our first year, we have focused on an education module covering characteristics and 
security needs of scientific CI, and the key concepts relevant to the security of scientific CI such 
as federated identities, delegation, and single sign-on. This module is targeted at audience 
group 1. An initial version of this module, in particular with a focus on delegation and single sign 
on, is on track to be debuted in a senior level security course (CS 461/ECE 422 Computer 
Security I) at the University of Illinois this Fall. We will disseminate these modules freely via the 
CTSC website and are actively seeking additional adopters to provide feedback and improve the 
modules.  
A module that targets audience group 2, and focuses on basic security concepts and motivate 
the need for security in scientific CI has also been worked on and is expected to be available in 
Spring 2014. 
 
3.3  Summer of Networking 
 
CTSC supports the development of skilled cybersecurity professionals and researchers by 
directly engaging students in stimulating cybersecurity activities. CTSC collaborated with 
Indiana University’s successful Summer of Networking program18 to provide cybersecurity-
focused an internship for one student, Betsy Thomas, who researched and completed a 
theoretical design for an intrusion detection system for virtual organizations. Betsy and another 
Summer of Networking student, Epaphras Matsangaise, both continue to work with CTSC into 
the Fall of 2013 as hourly research assistants. 
 
3.4  Outreach 
 
CTSC undertakes outreach activities both to disseminate its work and to make NSF CI projects 
aware of its services. CTSC’s outreach mechanisms include the CTSC website (trustedci.org), an 
ongoing blog covering CTSC’s activities (blog.trustedci.org), and a Twitter account to 
disseminate both the CTSC blog posts and other cybersecurity news of interest to NSF CI 
projects (twitter.com/trustedci). CTSC’s final online outreach component is the recently 
established Trusted CI Forum (trustedci.groupsite.com) to support ongoing community to be 
established at the NSF Cybersecurity Summit. 
Presentations made by CTSC were: 
 Von Welch. Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure. Presentation at NSF, July 2013. 
http://www.vonwelch.com/pubs/CTSC-NSF-NSF2013 
 Von Welch. NSF Cybersecurity Summit. Presentation at NSF Large Facilities Security 
Committee, July 2013 
                                                             
18 http://incntre.iu.edu/summer/  
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 Von Welch. Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure: Challenges and Opportunities. 
Presentation at USC/ISI, March 2013. http://www.vonwelch.com/pubs/CTSC-ISI-
MAR2013 
 Von Welch. Managing a software project - the dos and don'ts. Presentation at NSF SI2 PI 
Meeting, January 2013. http://www.vonwelch.com/pubs/SI2-JAN2013 
 Von Welch. CACR Cyberinfrastructure Projects. Supercomputing 2012 IU Booth 
Presentation, November 2012. http://www.vonwelch.com/pubs/CACR-SC12 
Additionally, a one-page handout on CTSC19 was distributed at Supercomputing 2012 and the 
2013 Bro Exchange. 
 
4  Leadership of NSF CI Cybersecurity 
 
A key challenge for CTSC is being responsive to community needs, while also staying ahead of 
emerging problems and providing leadership in addressing them. Over the course of its day-to-
day activities, CTSC needs to lead the community towards a coherent, interoperable 
cybersecurity ecosystem while serving each individual project well. CTSC leverages a broad 
understanding of the NSF CI community to actively seek opportunities to align cybersecurity 
solutions for interoperability to better support collaboration. 
 
4.1  NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Cyberinfrastructure and Large 
Facilities 
 
Spanning six years from 2004-2009, the NSF-funded annual Cybersecurity Summits served as a 
valuable part of the process of securing the NSF-funded cyberinfrastructure (CI) and MREFC 
projects by providing the community with the opportunity to share best practices, educate 
themselves from experts both from within and from outside of the community, and collaborate 
on solving common challenges. 
Under a supplemental award, CTSC is re-launching the NSF Cybersecurity Summit for 
Cyberinfrastructure and Large Facilities (“the NSF Cybersecurity Summit”). The 2013 Summit is 
scheduled September 30 through October 2, 2013 at the Hilton Arlington near NSF 
headquarters. The 2013 Summit will provide training opportunities from both CTSC (Secure 
Coding Practices, Risk-based Cybersecurity Programs for PIs and Managers, and Streamlining 
Collaboration with InCommon and Identity Federations) and from the Bro Team (Network 
Security and Monitoring). 
The plenary session will focus on refining the requirements for an NSF CI cybersecurity program 
and how to best foster collaboration and the sharing of best practices and lessons learned 
between NSF CI projects to build a coherent NSF CI cybersecurity ecosystem. The final day will 
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have the participants in different working groups to work on challenges identified during the 
plenary. 
CTSC envisions the Summit as an ongoing annual event. Towards that end, CTSC has 
instantiated the Trusted CI Forum (https://trustedci.groupsite.com) to provide the community 
with a place to interact during the year between summits, and plans to re-propose a Summit to 
NSF next year. 
 
4.2  A Risk-Based Cybersecurity Program Design Process for CI 
 
CTSC has subscribed to a risk-based approach to the development of cybersecurity programs. 
What this translates into is identifying and evaluating the cybersecurity risks associated with a 
project and then using that work to design a cybersecurity program that fits the needs of that 
particular project. CTSC’s approach is based off of the standard NIST 800-3020 approach and is 
informed by earlier risk assessments performed by NCSA and PSC for other NSF projects 
including Blue Waters, XSEDE, and GENI. 
CTSC has been tailoring this approach to address the challenges particular to the NSF CI 
community. A primary challenge is that every NSF CI project we have worked with is embedded 
in and leverages varying degrees of the commodity IT infrastructure, cybersecurity 
infrastructure and cybersecurity policies of the university or organization that hosts them. 
Trying to assess this entire infrastructure would be impossible with any reasonable amount of 
effort, and even if possible, would bear little benefit since CTSC’s ability to influence this 
infrastructure and policies to any meaningful degree is extremely limited. Instead, CTSC is 
working on abstractions and best practices that cover these topics to allow CTSC (and other NSF 
CI projects) to reasonably include them in an assessment and cybersecurity plan without undue 
effort. 
Additional challenges include: 
 These prior assessments were significant undertakings and represented more resource 
hours to complete than CTSC felt we could expect from smaller scale NSF CI project 
teams. 
 Addressing unusual and even unique scientific instruments and data. 
 Unusual requirements of the science community, such as the need for privacy of pre-
publication data and concerns about data integrity that might bring science results into 
question. 
 Efficiently addressing the fact most CI projects are embedded in one or more 
organizations (universities or research laboratories) and benefit from, and are restricted 
by, their cybersecurity programs and commodity IT infrastructure.  
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CTSC has been honing the previously mentioned risk assessment approaches to be more 
streamlined, with a set of common threats and types of assets for CI projects, and methods for 
abstracting the complicated relationships with their underlying organizations. We expect to 
keep improving this approach throughout the life of CTSC, but we will be sharing our current 
practices and processes this Fall as a training session at the NSF Cybersecurity Summit. 
 
4.3  CTSC Cybersecurity Program 
 
CTSC itself is an NSF CI project and hence followed its own guidance and developed it’s own 
cybersecurity program. CTSC has made its program publicly available21, along with supporting 
documentation, in order to both provide an example to the community and help establish the 
trust of potential engagees that their information will be appropriately protected. 
 
4.4  CTSC Whitepapers and Technical Reports 
 
CTSC’s leadership efforts include the publication of papers providing both guidance to the 
community and stating opinions of direction to unify community approach: 
 Jim Basney and Von Welch. Science Gateway Security Recommendations. Science 
Gateway Institute Workshop (at IEEE Cluster 2013), September 2013. 
http://www.vonwelch.com/pubs/GWSecurity13 
 Randy Heiland, Betsy Thomas, Von Welch and Craig Jackson. Toward a Research 
Software Security Maturity Model. Workshop on Sustainable Software for Science: 
Practice and Experiences (submitted), November 2013. 
http://www.vonwelch.com/pubs/WSSPE13 
 Jim Basney and Von Welch. Enabling Cross-Campus Research Collaborations: The IdM 
Provisioning and Deployment Challenge. Identity Management Collaboration Meeting, 
Chicago. IL. August 2013. http://www.vonwelch.com/pubs/KeyIdM13 
 
4.5  Interagency, Higher Ed and International Collaborations 
 
Fostering interoperability between NSF CI and the global research computing ecosystem is a 
key goal in CTSC efforts. To that end, in addition to the previously described international 
identity federation efforts with LIGO, CTSC is maintaining strong ties with DHS activities through 
Welch and Basney’s role as co-PIs in the DHS Software Assurance Marketplace (SWAMP), and is 
also in process of initiating collaborations with the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council’s newly forming cybersecurity working group. We maintain good ties with the 
Internet2 and Higher Ed community through Basney and Koranda’s participation on the 
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InCommon Technical Advisory and Assurance Advisory Committees respectively. Additionally 
our advisory committee, discussed in the next section, provides us with additional ties to the 
DOE, Internet2, higher education, and International communities. 
 
5  CTSC Advisory Committee 
 
To make sure CTSC is well aligned with the needs of the NSF CI community and in touch with 
the broader CI and cybersecurity communities, it established an advisory committee to help 
inform and steer its efforts. The committee was formed at the start of the project and met once 
in the first year, with a second in-person meeting scheduled in November 2013 at 
Supercomputing 13 in Denver. 
The CTSC advisory committee members are:  
 Tom Barton is senior director for architecture, integration and chief information security 
officer at the University of Chicago. 
 Neil Chue Hong is director of the Software Sustainability Institute (SSI), the UK national 
facility for cultivating world-class research through software. 
 Don E. Middleton leads the Visualization and Enabling Technologies Section in NCAR's 
Computational and Information Systems Laboratory and currently serves as PI or co-PI 
on a number of projects, including the Earth System Grid, the Earth System Curator, the 
Virtual Solar Terrestrial Observatory, the North American Regional Climate Change 
Assessment Program, the Cooperative Arctic Data and Information Service, and NCAR's 
Cyberinfrastructure Strategic Initiative. 
 Nicholas J. Multari is the senior project manager for research in cybersecurity at the 
Pacific Northwest National Lab (PNNL) in Richland, Washington. 
 Nancy Wilkins-Diehr of the San Diego Supercomputing Center has a breadth of 
experience in community engagement. She is currently director of  XSEDE's Extended 
Collaborative Support for Communities program, which includes Science Gateway 
initiatives. She is also the PI on a Science Gateway Institute conceptualization grant. 
For full bios, please see http://trustedci.org/advisory-committee/. 
 
6  Year 1 Lessons Learned and Challenges 
 
CTSC has identified a number of lessons learned and ongoing challenges in its first year (in no 
particular order): 
 Practice makes perfect: While CTSC consists of cybersecurity professionals who have 
undertaken many risk assessments and developed numerous cybersecurity plans over 
their careers, CTSC provides an opportunity to perform those tasks with a frequency and 
level of collaboration that would not otherwise exist. This provides the opportunity to 
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experiment with different techniques and determine what approaches best serve the 
NSF CI community. 
 Tension of sharing: CTSC seeks to have as broad an impact as possible by sharing the 
work products of its engagements with the whole NSF CI community. However, projects 
are sometimes reluctant to allow this. We hope the Trusted CI Forum will provide 
projects with sufficient privacy to make them comfortable with sharing these products. 
 Importance of engagement planning: Before undertaking the technical work involved in 
a collaboration, CTSC develops an engagement plan in consultation with the engaged 
project. This document has proven invaluable in ensuring the scope, timeline, 
committed resources and outcomes are well understood by both parties. 
 Challenge of community IT and underlying organizations: As we described previously, 
every NSF CI project we have worked with is embedded in and leverages varying 
degrees of the commodity IT infrastructure, cybersecurity infrastructure and 
cybersecurity policies of the university or organization that hosts them. CTSC is working 
on abstractions and best practices that cover these topics to allow CTSC (and other NSF 
CI projects) to reasonably include them in an assessment and cybersecurity plan without 
undue effort. 
 Engagement Impact Metrics: We continue to wrestle with appropriate impact metrics 
for the engagements. Our collection of statements from the projects for this report was 
an initial attempt, but we suspect it was premature to gauge impact from the 
engagements as insufficient time had passed to make impact clear. 
 
7  Year 2 Plans 
 
In this section we describe CTSC’s plans for project year 2 (Oct 1, 2013 - Sep 30, 2014). 
 
7.1  Engagements 
 
CTSC will continue to spend the majority of its effort on engagements with NSF CI projects to 
address their cybersecurity challenges. At the upcoming NSF Cybersecurity Summit, CTSC will 
announce an open call for projects to request an engagement with CTSC. In our proposal and 
subsequent revised statement of work, we indicated we would undertake four engagements in 
year two, a number we plan to easily surpass given our completion of three and our substantial 
progress on four more engagements in year one. 
In addition to these larger engagements, CTSC recognizes a need for shorter, informal 
interactions with projects that may turn into a longer engagement or may satisfy a project’s 
need in itself. We will experiment with offering these lighter-weight engagements by allowing 
projects to ask questions or undertake “expert access” phone calls or meetings with projects. 
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7.2  Engagement Follow-ups 
 
It is critical to CTSC to ensure that our engagements are having impact to the collaborating 
projects. We will follow up with each of the projects we engaged within year one to solicit 
feedback on how our engagement impacted the project once some time has passed. 
 
7.3  Education, Outreach and Training 
 
In year two the training program will focus its efforts on refining our newly created identity 
management and cybersecurity program tutorials and finding more venues to deliver them (we 
plan on revisiting XSEDE and Supercomputing, as well as exploring options such as the NSF 
Large Facilities workshop22 and the SI2 PI meeting). The University of Wisconsin team will 
concentrate in the coming year on practical, hands on materials to go along with their tutorials 
on vulnerability assessment and secure programming. These materials will include the software 
infrastructure (delivered via virtual machine) and instructional presentations and documents to 
direct the students. 
We will also investigate the electronic delivery of this material with the goal of making at least 
one of these tutorials available for on-demand access by the community, as well as augmenting 
it with a list of other training resources from the broader community of use to the CI 
community and made it available on the CTSC website. 
NSF recently funded a major new security initiative focused on network security and monitoring 
(PIs: Sommer and Slagell). This area of training will be a major focus for collaboration between 
these two groups, both in terms of sharing material and coordinating venues. We note that the 
two teams are already collaborating on training at the upcoming 2013 NSF Cybersecurity 
Summit. 
Education activities in year 2 will see the continued development of education modules 
targeting audience group 1 with emphasis placed on the security technologies currently in use 
and under development for scientific CI. Lessons learned and feedback obtained from the use 
of modules in the senior level computer security course at the University of Illinois will inform 
the development of these education modules in year 2. We also plan to complete the 
development of education modules targeted at audience group 2 (students who are end users 
of CI, but who may not necessarily have a background in security) and debut them in a course. 
We are currently working to identify such a course both at and outside CTSC partner 
institutions. 
Outreach activities will continue to focus on producing best practices and other contributions 
aimed at guiding the community. We will produce white papers with guidance on password 
management and getting started with software assurance. 
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7.4  NSF Cybersecurity Summit and Trusted CI Forum 
 
Our vision is for the NSF Cybersecurity Summit and the Trusted CI Forum to serve as an ongoing 
platform for the NSF CI Community to collaborate on cybersecurity. CTSC will continue to 
operate and manage the Forum and we plan on making a proposal to NSF for further 
supplemental funds to host another Forum in 2014. 
 
7.5  State of NSF Cybersecurity Report 
 
CTSC’s plan to create an annual report on the state of practice of cybersecurity in the NSF 
scientific CI community in year one was delayed to take advantage of the results we expect to 
emerge from the NSF Cybersecurity Summit. We plan to either integrate this report with the 
Cybersecurity Summit report (if that integration works) or publish it separately by the end of 
2013. This report will contains a gap analysis that documents key challenges and missing 
functionality, as well as major changes to the cybersecurity ecosystem over the past year. The 
report will be disseminated on the CTSC website. 
 
8  Conclusion 
 
CTSC has had a very successful year one with three engagements completed, three nearly 
completed and a seventh already initiated. We are developing a risk assessment and 
cybersecurity planning process for NSF CI Cybersecurity programs that incorporates well-known 
best practices as well as tackles NSF CI challenges of being embedded in other organizations, 
and handling their unique instruments and data assets. We have successfully relaunched and 
organized the NSF Cybersecurity Summit along with a Trusted CI Forum to foster an ongoing 
NSF community focused on NSF CI cybersecurity. Leveraging prior training materials from the 
University of Wisconsin team and creating two new tutorials, we delivered seven training 
sessions. Educational activities included creating a new education module on cybersecurity for 
CI that is being utilized in a class at the University of Illinois this Fall, mentoring of a student in 
Indiana University’s Summer of Networking program and the ongoing membership of two 
students in the CTSC team as research assistants. Our broader impacts include the publication 
of engagement products and three other papers to define community best practices. 
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